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COMMENTS

A Proposalfor a Fountainheadof Rationality in
The Juriprudenceof Insanity
Faced with the eternal metaphysical question: Can man ever know man fully?
we find modern man answering in the affirmative without rationality. Unwilling to
assent to the reality of the Intellectual Soul, he has with anxiety and in frustration
attempted to solve the mystery of man by thrusting him into a test tube. An
analysis of the operations of rational life can only lead us to a workable understanding of the true nature of man,' whether he be mentally sick or well. To
conclude that the Uncaused Cause of all being can alone infinitely know what is in
a man's mind, is not to suggest that we should relax our striving for a better
understanding of human nature.
Hence, the purpose of this paper: to present a picture of the progress of the
human court of justice in its attempt to reach a better understanding of the nature
of mental illness when insanity is interposed as a defense to criminal responsibility.
In this difficult area of criminal law and procedure, involving those technical
cases in which a defense of insanity is raised, there have been serious indictments
of those charged with the law's administration that, in the words of Dr. Winfred
Overholser: I
• . . the law still proceeds on the basis of psychological assumptions which are
not in line with prevailing psychiatric points of view.

Although the law must not be overcautious and fail thereby to truly progress,
those entrusted with the effectual administration of justice must be extremely
prudent in accepting novel principles which the test of time may prove to be
incorrect.
The existing law, with respect to defense of insanity cases has evolved from
an intricate history of confusion and controversy. The implications of the recent
decision Monte Durham v. United States3 are twofold: it constitutes an important
step in the eradication of a serious objection to the existing substantive law, and
eliminates the effective aspects of the old tests.
The Case That Changed The Law In The District Of Columbia
Monte Durham was convicted of housebreaking by the District Court sitting
without a jury after a waiver of this right. The only defense asserted at the trial
was that Durham was of unsound mind at the time of the offense. Durham had a
long history of imprisonment and hospitalization, which indicated a profound
1 Man is not matter alone. He is a composite of body and vital principle, the latter
referred to as the "intellectual soul" in Dr. Cavanagh's treatise.
2 See: Overholser, The Psychiatrist and the Law, New York: Harcourt, Brace and
Company 1953, p. 6.
8214 F. 2d 862 (1954).

personality disorder. Following the indictment, he was adjudged of unsound mind
upon the affidavits of two psychiatrists. He was committed to St. Elizabeth's
Mental Hospital. This commitment lasted sixteen months, when he was released
to the custody of the district jail on the certificate of St. Elizabeth's that he was
"mentally competent to stand trial and.. . able to consult with counsel to properly
assist in his own defense." Durham's conviction followed Judge Holtzoff's rejection of the defense of insanity because the defendant did not establish to the
satisfaction of the court that at the time of the crime he was of unsound mind in
the sense that he didn't know the difference between "right and wrong" or that
even if he did, he was not subject to an "irresistible impulse" by reason of a
derangement of mind. The lower court held that the usual presumption of sanity
governs because: "There is no testimony concerning the mental state of the defendant", as of the date the crime was committed, "while if there was some
testimony as to his mental state as of that date to the effect that he was competent
on that date, the burden of proof would be on the government to overcome it."
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the lower court was in error in
failing to find "some evidence". The Appeals Court was of the opinion that since
the requirement of "some evidence" was satisfied, the presumption of sanity failed
and the burden of proof then shifted to the prosecution to prove the defendant's
sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.
After a thorough consideration of the existing tests for criminal responsibility
in the District of Columbia, the Court found both the Right and Wrong test and
the IrresistibleImpulse test as exclusive criteria, inadequate. It invoked its inherent
power to adopt a new test, viz:
The rule we now hold must be applied on the retrial of this case and in future
cases is not unlike that followed by the New Hampshire courts since 1870. 4
It is simply that an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful
act was the product of mental disease or mental defect.

The Evolution Of The Jurisprudence Of Insanity
The law has long recognized that those suffering from a mental disorder
should not be held legally responsible for their criminal acts which are the result
of the mental illness. In Roman Law the insane person was considered incapable
of assuming civil rights and responsibilities. This was due to the theory that
because he lacked free will he was incapable of volitional activity.' There is very
little authority on the subject of insanity as a defense to criminal responsibility to
be extracted from the times of both the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. This
is due for the most part to the emphasis in lunacy law upon the lunatic's and idiot's
right to property.6 As a result to this emphasis upon property rights, the insane
4State v. Pike, 49 N.H. (1 Shirley) 399 (1870); State v. Jones, 50 N.H. (2 Shirley)
369,398 (1871).
1 Deutsch, Mentally Ill in America, New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc.
1937, p.388.
6Lunacy and Idiocy---the Old Law and its Incubus, 18 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 361 (1950).

person who did not possess property, was given little, and many times no consideration in criminal cases,' and ". . in certain regions of medieval Europe insanity
was expressly barred as a defense in criminal trials." Deutsch points out that
although as early as the fourteenth century the common law courts of England
began to recognize insanity as a defense to crime, it was not until the beginning
of the seventeenth century that "tests" began to evolve as an aid to determining the
kind and degree of insanity that would be sufficient to excuse from criminal
responsibility.'
Sir Matthew Hale advanced a theory that only total insanity would excuse
from crime. Hale described partial insanity in the following manner:
Some persons that have a competent use of reason in some respect to some
subject, are yet under a particular dementia in respect to some particular
courses, subjects or applications, or else it is partial in respect of degrees.
Hale concluded that such partial insanity ". . . seems not to excuse them in the
committing of any offense for its matter capital."10 Hale suggested that "the best
measure for total insanity" is whether the accused person has no more than the
mental capacity of a child of fourteen years due to a laboring "under melancholy
distempers". This "test" was criticized by Sir James Fitzjames Stephens in 1889:
Surely no two states of mind can be more unlike than that of a healthy boy
of fourteen and that of a man laboring under melancholy distempers. The one
is healthy immaturity, the other diseased maturity and between them there is
no sort of resemblance."
One of the great writers at this time on the subject of insanity and the
criminal law was Hawkins, who set up the Good and Evil test by advocating that:
"Those who are under a natural disability of distinguishing between good and evil"
should not be punished under any criminal prosecution.' 2
In 1724, in the Case of Arnold, Judge Tracy defined what he considered the
nature of mental illness which would excuse from criminal punishment. In his
charge to the jury, he laid down what was theretofore known as the Wild Beast
test:
: . it is not every kind of frantic humor ... in a man's actions, that points
him out to be such a madman as to be exempted from punishment; it must
be a man that is totally deprived of his understanding and memory, and
doth not know what he is doing, no more than... a wild beast.
The Hadfield Case in 1800 disregarded the test for total insanity previously
set forth by Hale, and presented as an equally inadequate substitution: the finding
of a single symptom of delusion as the final and perfect test of criminal responsibility.' 3
7Deutsch, op. cit. supra note 5, at 388.
8Ibid.
9Id. at 389.
10 Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown, London: Vol. 1, 1678, p. 30.
"1Stephens, History of the Criminal Law of England, London: Vol. 2, 1883, p. 150-1.
12 Deutsch, op. cit. supra note 5, at 391.
13 Glueck, Crime and Correction, Mass. Addison-Wesley Press, Inc. 1952, p. 150.
Sheldon Glueck states: "The delusion concept ... while not in itself a test of irresponsibility,
is sometimes an element considered in connection with one of the tests and like the other
principles on the subject is today in a confused state."

Then came the adoption of the two most important tests for consideration:
the Right and Wrong test and the IrresistibleImpulse test. The Right and Wrong
or Knowledge test became and has remained the principal test for criminal insanity in all but one jurisdiction in the United States," until the Durham decision.
15
The Right and Wrong test remains the sole test in at least twenty-eight states,'
and seventeen have recognized Irresistible Impulse as an additional test. 16
The Right And Wrong Test
A modified version of the Right and Wrong test was given birth to in the
monumental M'Naghten affair of 1843.17 Previous to this time the Right and
Wrong test required that the accused, in order to be entitled to an acquittal on the
ground of insanity, be unable to distinguish between right and wrong in general.' "
The trial of Daniel M'Naghten, a paranoic with insane delusions, resulted in
acquittal on the ground of insanity. After the trial, the pressure of public reaction
warranted a request by the House of Lords that 15 judges opinionaie upon the
existing laws governing insanity. The questions propounded to the judges were
specifically limited to the case of a person afflicted with an insane delusion as was
M'Naghten. Fourteen of the judges agreed on two major rules in order to
establish a defense on the ground of insanity: (1) "... it must be clearly proved
that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was laboring
under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature
and quality of the act he was doing, or" (2) "... if he did know it, that he did
not know he was doing what was wrong."'"
It must be noted that the modified test refers to the very act charged. This
is the distinguishing feature of the modified version. The innumerable cases which
followed the M'Naghten opinion, reflect the confusion as to the meaning of the
terminology used by the judges in spelling out the rule.20 Sheldon Glueck points
out that the vague terms "nature" and "quality" were bound to cause confusion:
14In the New Hampshire rule, laid down in the case: State v. Jones, supra note 4,
the issue is whether the act charged was: "The offspring or the product of mental disease
in the defendant." The jury answers two questions: (1) Had the prisoner a mental disease?
(2) If he had, was the disease of such a character, or was it so far developed, or had it
so far subjugated the powers of the mind as to take away the capacity to form or entertain
criminal intent.

15 Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin.
16 Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Wyoming, Montana, New Mexico,
Ohio.
17 Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & Finnelly, 200 (1843).
18 Glueck, op. cit. supra note 13, at 142.
19 See note 17 supra.
20 As to the meaning of "right and wrong" and "nature and quality", Professor Glueck
lucidly detailed the confusion that exists:
"Some (states) cite the nature and quality elements in the test disjunctively with the
right and wrong feature, some conjunctively." See note 2 supra at 575.

Whether the judges used the terms "nature and quality" as synonomous or
whether they intended each word to have a distinct meaning and therefore
that knowledge should have existed as to two different factors with regard
to the act is not clear . . . If they did so intend, however, why did
they use the word "it" as referring to both 2nature and quality, instead of
"them" or a similar term implying the plural? '
It is insisted by some authorities that it was the intention of the judges that
a distinct and separate meaning be given to the terms "nature and quality."22 A

careful study of the decisions will indicate a condition -somewhat as follows:
Some decisions today speak of knowledge of right and wrong in general,
some of right and wrong as to the particular act involved, many employing
these concepts interchangeably and indifferently. Some states have adopted
the right and wrong from the point of view of knowledge of moral wrong,
some from that of knowledge of legal wrong, some include both ...
in other scraps
Many decisions jumble all these elements together throwing
of expert and inexpert opinion and dictum for good measure.23
But a look at the words of the test itself will clearly illustrate that the judges
in the M'Naghten Case meant to relieve the accused of punishment for the act
only if ". . . he did not know he was doing what was wrong." They laid stress

upon moral subjective responsibility as a vital consideration. A clear cut distinction is made between knowing the nature and quality of the act, that is a
knowledge of the objective wrongness or incorrectness, and knowing its wrongfulness. It is only when such "moral sense" is regarded as an outworn phrenological concept that inconsistency in the decisions reflect disagreement. It must
be noted that confusion was the natural consequence of various conflicting psychological and philosophical theories.
To the present day the cases are far from clear in any state as to the proper
24
application of the Knowledge test.
Perhaps such confusion has in part also resulted from the failure to understand
the difference between responsibility and guilt.25 Should a defendant's responsibility for his act be based upon the patient's subjective judgment of himself as
acting rightly or wrongly? Dr. Cavanaugh takes the position that there is little
doubt that when reference is made to the Right and Wrong test the question of
right and wrong refers to the right and wrong as a subjective evaluation of the
objective order. That is to say, he looks upon the mentally ill man as one having
26
misapprehensions of objective reality.
21 Glueck, op. cit. supra note 13, at 142.

Oppenheimer, Criminal Responsibility of Lunatics, 142 et. seq.
Glueck, op. cit. supra note 13, at 144.
People v.Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324, 110 N.E. 945 (1915).
25 Dr. Cavanagh in his treatise, supra, draws a distinction between responsibility and
guilt when he states: "Responsibility does not mean punishability. It means only that the
individual, whose responsibility is under examination, at the time he performed a certain
act or acts, was in such a state of mental health that he was able to act freely on the
basis of a proper subjective evaluation of his act or acts in accordance with objective reality"
• .."Responsibility in its derivation means ability to react to a situation, that is, to respond
to punishment or to be deterred by punishment. There is frequent failure to understand the
difference between responsibility and guilt."
26 In reference to this point, Dr. Cavanagh states: "A man may believe subjectively that
22
28
24
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Whether the use of the Knowledge test has value in determining responsi.
bility is clearly dependent upon the proper interpretation and application of the
test. But this question is of different consideration from whether this test should
be used as the sole criteria for determining legal responsibility in criminal insanity
cases.
The M'Naghten rule was formally adopted by the District of Columbia in
1882.27 In the Guiteau Case the court said:
Insanity is a defense on the very ground that it disables the accused from
knowing that his act is wrong. The very essence of the inquiry is whether
his insanity is such as to deprive him of that knowledge.

This test remained the sole criterion for the determination of criminal responsibility in insanity cases until 1929 when in the case of Smith v. United
States2" the court held:
That the accused must be capable, not only of distinguishing between
right and2 9 wrong, but that he was not impelled to do the act by an irresistible
impulse.

The Irresistible Impulse Test
The irresistible impulse test encompassing the idea that the accused person
had not sufficient will power to commit the act, by reason of mental unsoundness,
originated in America in the case of State v. Thompson."' In this case the court
instructed the jury that the defendant was responsible ".

.

. if at the time (he)

could discriminate between right and wrong, and was conscious of the wrongfulness of the act, and had power to forbear or to do the act."
In the jurisdictions that have adopted the Irresistible Impulse test in addition
to the Knowledge test proceed upon the theory that irresponsibility may result
from the presence of an insane irresistible impulse even though knowledge of the
nature and quality and wrongfulness of the act may allegedly have existed.
Although the test was not accepted in connection with the Right and Wrong
test until much later it is interesting to note Lord Denham in his address to the
jury in the M'Naghten case, which involved insane delusion, asked the jury to
consider the possibility of an irresistible impulse as the motivating force in
M'Naghten's crime when he said:
If some controlling disease was, in truth, the acting power within him, which
he could not resist, then he will not be responsible.

But Denham was only referring to cases of delusional insanity when he made this
request to the jury. After M'Naghten's trial, the questions propounded to the
judges were specifically limited to the case of a person "afflicted with an insane
delusion" as was M'Naghten. Lord Denham joined in the answers of the judges
he is doing right, whereas the act itself is wrong. The presence of misrepresentations of
reality does not in itself relieve a man of responsibility. It would, however, if this misrepresentation was due to mental illness. It would undoubtedly relieve him of any guilt, if
he sincerely believed, on the basis of his misrepresentations, that he was doing right."
27 The Guiteau Case, 1 Mackey 498 (D.C. Sup. Ct. 1882).
28 59 App. D.C. 144, 36 F. 2d 548 (1929).
29 Id. at 145.
30 (Ohio 1834).

to the questions of the Lords.

Keedy points out:

It is not likely . . . that Lord Denham . . . would have done so if he had
believed that the answers
related to any problems of mental disease other
than insane delusion. 31
Keedy draws the conclusion that if the judges had been asked to state the test
when insanity is set up as a defense they would have included in their answers
that an irresistible impulse could be a defense in other types of insanity, and since
the question of a test was restricted to delusional insanity the Knowledge test came
to be generally employed whereas Irresistible Impulse was not acceptable as a
defense until much later. There was an ensuing struggle on whether Irresistible
Impulse was a valid defense.
There followed much controversy and conflict of authority as to whether the
defense of Irresistible Impulse should be allowed, when the felon is able to tell
the nature and quality of the act. The principal reasons for not recognizing
Irresistible Impulse even though such is the product of mental disease were (1)
one who knows the difference between right and wrong cannot have an irresistible impulse;3 2 (2) it is difficult to prove that there is an irresistible impulse.
"It seems to us however, that in the view suggested the difficulty would be great,
if not insuperable, of establishing by satisfactory proof that an impulse was or was
not 'uncontrollable'."3 8 Justice Summerville in Parsons v. State34 refutes this
argument when he states:
It is no satisfactory objection that the rule (Irresistible Impulse test)
announced by us is by difficult application. The rule in M'Naghten's Case is
equally obnoxious to a like criticism. The difficulty does not lie in the
rule, but is inherent in the subject of insanity itself.
James Fitzjames Stevens expressed the opinion that IrresistibleImpulse should
be a defense and a person who acts under such an impulse does not know the
nature of his act.33 Yet courts have held that there should be no conviction "even
if the prisoner knew .'. . that it was morally wrong and punishable by law and
yet was from mental disease deprived of the power of controlling his actions at
the time.""6 As a result of this shattering instruction, the Lord Chancellor in the
True case 7 appointed a commission to investigate the problem of existing "tests"
of insanity for a defense to criminal responsibility. The Commission did not
approve a recommendation submitted by the British Medical Association which
offered this proposal:
The legal criteria of responsibility expressed in the rule in M'Naghtens case
should be abrogated and the responsibility of a person should be left as a
81 Keedy, irresistibleImpulse in the Criminal Law, 100 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 961 (1952).
32 "The possibility of the existence of such a mental condition is too doubtful." Cunningham
v. State, 56 Misc. 269, 279 (1879).
3
8 State v. Bundy, 24 S.C. 439, 445 (1886).
3481 Ala. 577, 596, 2 So. 854 (1886).
85 Stephens, op. cit. supra note 11, at 168, 171.
6
8 Case of Ronald True, 16 Cr. App. R. 164, 169 (1922).
7Iid.

question of fact to be determined by the jury on the merits of the
particular case.""

Professor Hall offered a mild rebuke to the courts for attempting to determine
by judicial decision whether an irresistible impulse can exist: "Whether a truly
irresistible impulse can exist is a question for psychiatrists rather than for judges
to decide and judicial denials that such a condition is possible have rather gone out
of fashion.' 8 However, the validity of the test is a matter for judicial determination.
The major problem is to be considered in an evaluation of the Irresistible
Impulse test is whether it is possible for a human being to have an Irresistible
Impulse? If the various functions of the personality are integrated, how can a
person understand what he is doing, realize that inflicting a serious injury on a
human being is grossly immoral but, nevertheless at the same time be so impaired
in his power to control his conduct that he is irresistibly impelled to commit a
major harm?
The majority of the decisions which have employed the Irresistible Impulse
test recognize that the cognitive powers need not necessarily have been disturbed
for the defendant to have been the victim of an irresistible impulse to commit the
act. In the case of State v. Peel,40 the court said:
One may have mental capacity and intelligence sufficient to distinguish
between right and wrong with reference to the particular act and to understand the consequences of its commission, and yet be so far deprived of
volition and self control by the overwhelming violence of mental disease
that he is not capable of voluntary action and therefore not able to choose
the right and avoid the wrong.
Sheldon Glueck analyzes the well known Massachusetts case of Commonwealth
v. Rogers 41 as probably the first instance of the judicial recognition of the need of
proof of the volitional element as well as the cognitive in the definition of a
crime in insanity cases:
This important decision recognizes the important psychological fact of the
unity of the mental processes, in that it takes account of the influence of a
delusional system not only
upon the cognitive faculties of the mind but
42
upon the volitional life.

Guttmacher and Weihofen, in their book "Psychiatry and the Law,"43 agree
on the one hand to the theory of one integrated personality per individual human
being, and on the other approve of the Irresistible Impulse test. Jerome Hall, in
his review of the book,44 points out that the authors attempt to resolve the conflict

by stating:
But while it is true that the effective, cognitive and conative processes of the
mind are interrelated (distinct from integration) certain forms of mental
Rep. Comm. on Insanity and Crime, Cmd. No. 2005, 4 (1923).
Hall, Psychiatryand the Law-Dual Review, 38 Iowa L.R. 687 (1952).
4023 Mont. 358, 59 Pac. 169 (1899).
41 7 Metcalf. 500 (Mass. 1844).
42 Glueck, op. cit. supra note 13, at 148.
43 Guttmacher and Weihofen, Psychiatry and the Law, New York: W. W. Norton &
Co. 1952.
38
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44

See note 39 supra.

disease may affect one more than the others. A disorder manifesting itself
in impulsive acts may affect intelligence somewhat, but it is quite
possible that impulsiveness may have reached the point where it can be
intelligence has not deteriorated so much as
said that it is irresistible and yet
to obliterate right and wrong.45

Keedy also takes this position.48 But Professor Hall considers his stand more
consistent. Because he agrees with the theory of the integrated personality,
he rejects the Irresistible Impulse doctrine:
In modern psychology integration has meant the personality functioning
as a unit as opposed to the operation of separate faculties. This suggests
the analogy of compound rather than of a4 7 mixture; a whole coalescence
rather than an interrelation of separate parts.

Hall then asks the question: "How, then, is it possible for the personality to be
seriously disordered in some basic functions while others remain substantially unimpaired?"' 8 However, Professor Hall is a staunch supporter of the Right and
Wrong test. In an interpretation consistent with his prevailing view that various
psychological functions are integrated; he suggests that the word "know" in the
M'Naghten rule should mean "knowing in a moral sense".
Dr. Frederick Wertham is in accord with Professor Hall in rejecting the
Irresistible Impulse doctrine and in supporting the Knowledge test:
In my opinion the criminal law which makes use of the conception of
irresistible impulse is not an advance belonging to the present scientific
social era. It is a throw-back
to or rather survival of, the previous philosophical
49

psychological era.

Sheldon Glueck criticizes both the Irresistible Impulse and the Right and
Wrong tests:
Their employment as such neglects the fundamental notion of the unity of
the mind and interrelationship of mental processes and the fact that a
disturbance in the cognitive, volitional, or emotional sphere, as the cause
may be, can hardly occur without its affecting5 0the personality as a whole and
the end conduct flowing from the personality.

It is conceded that the human personality is an integrated one. However
it is possible for the cognitive faculty to be in operation and yet for the volitional
to fail to resist the urge as presented by a mentally disordered intellect. This in
no way assents to the validity of the Irresistible Impulse theory.
Of basic consideration in an analysis of the Irresistible Impulse test, is the
metaphysical problem of the freedom of the will. The law has proceeded upon the
theory that insanity is a defense in criminal law precisely because an individual
should not be punished if he does not have freedom of his will.
The courts and psychiatrists have variously defined the term irresistible impulse. Most courts refer to it as the deprivation of the will power to choose
45 Ibid.
46 See note 31 supra at 993.
47 See note 44 supra, at 695.
48 Ibid.
49 Wertham, Psychiatry of CriminalGuilt, 164 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. (1950).
50 See note 13 supra.

whether to do the act or refrain from doing it; or to choose between right and
51
wrong.
The IrresistibleImpulse test is based on the assumption that in some forms
of mental illness the victim does not have freedom of will in the commission of
illegal acts and that freedom of will is essential to criminal responsibility. 2
In the famous case of Parsons v. State,53 the court said that freedom of the
will is just as an important consideration in criminal intent as knowledge of right
and wrong; and that even if the defendant knew right from wrong, " . . . he may
nevertheless not be legally responsible if the two following conditions concur:
(1) If, by reason of the duress of such mental disease, he had so far lost his
power to choose between right and wrong, and to avoid doing the act in
question, as that his free agency was at the time destroyed.
(2) And if, at the same time the alleged crime was so connected with such
mental disease, in the relation of cause and effect, as to have been the
product of it solely."

In order to take advantage of the Irresistible Impulse test as a defense that
will bring about an acquittal, the defendant must prove that at the time he committed the act he was deprived of his free will by the insane impulse that he was
incapable of choice. Hence, the Irresistible Impulse test raises the presumption
that it is possible for the exercise of the free will to be suspended at the time of
the criminal act.
This raises the question of whether a man can ever be deprived of his free
will to choose, even at a time when he is suffering from a mental disorder. It is
precisely because of the multiplicity of interpretations in the answers given by
the various schools of thought to this philosophical question, that there exists
confusion in the use of this test.
In refutation of the IrresistibleImpulse test, we find Dr. Cavanagh5 4 saying:
The expression irresistible impulse connotes a distortion of the power of the
will itself. This is an inaccuracy . . . the distortion is not of the will but
of the whole person.

In other words, the will is always in operation, and the person acting, so chose
to act in one particular manner based upon his particular judgment of realityno matter how distorted was his judgment. This position is also advanced by
55
Dr. Nolan:
We know that the grossly insane never completely lose their powers of
judgment . . . Free will is exercised upon those conscious motives which

become present to our minds. These conscious motives may, in turn, be
influenced by unconscious factors, but the final choice is made by the will
upon the basis of those conscious judgments which the intellect entertains.
In other words, the will is free to act upon or to refuse to act upon those
motives which the mind presents.
51Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854 (1886).

62 This is a condensed version of an excerpt taken from "Relation of Mental Illness to
Delinquency and Crime", Michael J. Pescor, M.D. FEDERAL PROBATION, September, 1953,
p. 14.
53See note 51 supra.
54See Dr. Cavanagh's leading article, this review.
55 See Dr. Nolan's leading article, this review.

Dr. Cavanagh says: "The choice of words used in the term (Irresistible
Impulse) is unfortunate. The word impulse is incorrect. It leads to misunderstanding. A better word would be urge."5" Dr. Nolan would change the term
irresistible to unresisted. A combination of these two theories consider it more
accurate to re-label an irresistible impulse to an unresisted urge, and rightly so.
In Dr. Cavanagh's definition of unresisted urge,5" the phrases: "impelled to
act" and "unable to adhere" connote to the reader that mental illness deprives the
actor of the will power to choose. There appears to be no distinction between this
definition and the concept which the Irresistible Impulse test conveys to the Appeals Court in the Durham case: that the accused who suffers from an undefined
diseased mental condition is deprived of the will power to resist the insane impulse.
However, Dr. Cavanagh's philosophical interpretation of his definition clarifies to the reader that the will is always in operation, and that the will is able to
choose and does choose to perform the particular act. The urge to perform one act
rather than another is so strong that it occupies the whole field of consciousness;
presenting it to the will only as something desirable, while other notions which
might tend to represent the urge as undesirable to the will are precluded entrance
into the consciousness of the actor. The will chooses to satisfy the only urge
consciously presented. It is very clear from this explanation that the will never
ceases to choose.
The Durham Decision--Pro And Con
The new legal tests of criminal insanity in District of Columbia, which
jettisoned the old tests of insanity, has been both hailed as a major improvement in
the administration of justice, and warned against as an invitor of confusion due to
inherent vagueness.
The opposing factions are well represented in the following personal interviews with and reports of the authorities closely connected with the Durham case.
An Interview With Dr. Winfred Overholser*
In an interview with Dr. Overholser, one of the leading authorities in America
on Forensic Psychiatry, the authors were presented with his views concerning the
Durham decision and the various aspects of the present legal-psychiatric problem
of criminal insanity.
At the outset, Dr. Overholser expressed his enthusiastic approval of the ruling
of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. He considers the elimination
of the Knowledge and Impulse tests, as the exclusive tests for the determination of
Superintendent of St. Elizabeth's Hospital, Professor of Psychiatry at George
Washington School of Medicine.
5 See note 54 supra. Definition of Unresisted Urge: An unresisted urge is one which,
because of mental illness, so far causes the individual to lose his power of choice in regard
to particular acts that in spite of the fact that he may recognize an act as wrong, he feels
so impelled to act that he is unable to adhere to what he considers right. (Emphasis added.)

7Ibid.

criminal responsibility, an advancement in the law, desired by the psychiatric
profession. Dr. Overholser states: "Psychiatrists, in giving expert testimony as
to the mental condition of the defendant at the time of the criminal act, need no
longer play the role of a pseudo-doctor or a pseudo-lawyer. Since he is no longer
confined within the narrow limits of the antiquated tests, the psychiatrist is now
free to present to the jury his complete analysis of the defendant's mental
condition."
Dr. Overholser was pleased and proud over the fact that the District is the
first jurisdiction to follow the New Hampshire rule. Since the New Hampshire
rule is broad enough to include the Knowledge and the Impulse tests, he favors the
continued use of these tests as additional aids to the broadened ruling. "We should
be willing to consider anything, which will help us to arrive at a proper diagnosis
of the defendant's mental state."
He expressed his disapproval of the numerous jurisdictions which still adhere
to the Right and Wrong test as the sole criterion, because: "It is well known in
the field of psychiatry that many persons obviously suffering from severe mental
illness can tell the difference between right and wrong." He considers, therefore,
the IrresistibleImpulse test a welcome supplement or alternate to the M'Naghten
rule, though only one step forward. When questioned concerning the possibility
of an impulse being truly irresistible, Dr. Overholser stated that in some cases of
mental illness, such as true kleptomania, there may exist a real compulsion which
overpowers the will to resist.
In the new instructions of the Durham decision, Dr. Overholser does not think
that the court's use of the terms "mental disease" and "mental defect" should
present any problem to the psychiatrist."
He considers the court's definition of
these terms as psychiatrically accurate. Although the court's definition of "mental
disease", "... a condition which is considered capable of either improving or
deteriorating", offers no distinction between severe psychoses and mild neuroses,
Dr. Overholser feels that the common sense of the average jury will prevent the
acquittal of a defendant suffering only from a mild mental disorder. He considers
the present theorizing that the new ruling will effectuate a succession of acquittals,
ill-founded. "The effect of the test in this regard will in all probability be negligible. The new rule has not caused any epidemic of acquittals in New Hampshire,
anyway!"
Dr. Overholser agreed with the interviewers that there exists a conflict of
rights: the right of the public to be protected on the one hand, the right of the
person legally irresponsible for crime to be relieved of punishment, and that the
public's right to protection takes precedence until the hospitals are in a position to
accept additional commitments. In view of the public welfare involved, being
58 This opinion differs from the view expressed by Dr. Cavanagh. "The court has
attempted to define it (insanity) in terms of no symptoms at all and in terms which are so
confusing that they cannot be understood by most psychiatrists." See: Dr. Cavanagh, A
Psychiatrist Looks At The Durham Case, this issue.

confined in jail until arrangements can be made to admit the person to a mental
hospital should not be considered as synonymous with punishment.
The eminent psychiatrist offered the suggestion that the discretionary power
of the judge concerning the commitment and examination of the acquitted-defendant should be replaced with a tightened mandate, viz. to commit to a mental
hospital all those acquitted by reason of insanity, there to be detained until they
can be released without danger to the public. "The protection of society is the
important thing, whether the detention be in a prison or in a hospital. He favors
the establishment of court clinics, similar to the one just set up in the District.
With the new ruling, one of the most important functions of the psychiatrist
when offering his testimony, and of the court in giving its instructions, is to
simplify the terms involved so as to make them readily understandable to the lay
jury. "If this is done", says Dr. Overholser, "there is no need for a Blue Ribbon
jury. The jury is presumed to be representative of the public. Your suggestion
of an expert jury composed of e.g. psychiatrists, philosophers, psychologists and
sociologists, might result in the additional problem of how to resolve conflicting
professional opinions."
Dr. Overholser summed up his opinion of the new ruling by stating in effect
that, although long at arriving, it is a hopeful sign that the gap between psychiatry
and the law is narrowing.
An Interview With GerardI. O'Brien*
As Assistant United States Attorney, Mr. O'Brien played one of the major
roles in connection with the Durham case on appeal. He afforded the writers, in
the form of a constructive criticism, the opportunity of first hand information
concerning his interest in the consequences of the new ruling.
Mr. O'Brien commenced his discussion of the Durham decision with an
analysis of the "some evidence" question.
Under the "some evidence" test, it is naturally presumed that the government
has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to every
element of the crime. This doctrine has a ready application such as, with
respect to the footprint left on the soil; the fingerprint left on the gun; and
the eye-witness at the scene of the crime. But, we have yet to discover
a criminal who dropped his mind at the scene of the crime for psychiatric

observation.

We can hope for quick apprehension of the criminal, but such does not
mean an immediate subjection to mental examination, and, should it take
a considerable length of time for the state to apprehend the abscounding
criminal, it may be impossible for medical science to determine the exact

mental condition at the time of the crime.

Under the "some evidence" rule, the defense has only to raise the issue
of insanity, such as, that the defendant does not remember the crime no
matter how "weak, insufficient, inconsistent, or of doubtful credibility" that

evidence may be. Now, under the new ruling, the government must prove
the mind of the defendant to be neither "diseased" nor "defective", or that
it did not produce the criminal act. It would appear this burden is relatively

*B.S. University of Notre Dame 1945; LL.B. University of Notre Dame 1949;
LL.M. Catholic University of America 1951; Area Director, Great Books Foundation,
Washington, D. C.; Member, Ricobono Legal Seminar.

scientific, and the rigors of such burden may not be discovered until trial
when the defense asserts insanity.
It all raises a question as to whether the "some evidence" test as expressed
in the Davis decision in the year 1895, is now properly in step with the
burden placed on the prosecution.
Mr. O'Brien considers it of extreme importance that the determination of
responsibility remain the primary function of the psychiatrist in order that the
"
jury may determine guilt based upon such evidence. "
The jury should have the aid of psychiatry on the question of responsibilitya psychic element. How can any scientist presume to inform of the defendant's total personality and eliminate an important aspect of environmental
development. Not to consider the question of responsibility, presumes a matrix
of human personality ignorant of right and wrong. A form of this was
attempted by Hitler. As we know society, this matrix does not exist.
Psychiatry should aid in the determination of responsibility. Only in this
manner can scientific understanding of the defendant's subjective responsibility
for the commission of the crime be ascertained.

With clarity of expression, Mr. O'Brien presented the writers with what he
believes is an explanation of the Right and Wrong test.
Specifically, right and wrong should be a simple issue. It is unfortunate that
in instructions, judges plagiarize on the explanation given by the Judges of
England in the M'Naghten case of 1843. The law should be capable of simplifying Elizabethan terminology with the simplified language of our day.
The question really concerns whether, for example, when A pulled the trigger
and shot B: did A subjectively understand that B had a right to live, and
A for reasons of his own, determined that B should not. Somewhere in A's
mental experience, it can be presumed, until shown otherwise, that A was
either trained or had an acquaintance with the fact that he should not destroy
the life of another human being.
Inquiring into this understanding of A is to determine the reason why he
could not or would not conform to his understanding. We are not, under
the M'Naghten rule as pronounced, requiring A to explain the underlying
reason or principle for his understanding that he should not destroy the life
of another human being.
The opposition to right and wrong believe that the jury is testing A's
doctrine that makes the destruction
objective understanding of the moral
60
But, that is not the function of the
of human life intrinsically wrong.
Right abd Wrong test.
Until an amoral society evolves, it is difficult to divorce the psychic content
of today's moral understandings from that of an individual within the moral
society as it exists. In other words, society is only a composite or unit of
the individuals that make up society. The vast majority are today instructed
in the basic concept that it is wrong to take human life. In order to construct
an amoral society, it would be necessary to instruct individuals that make up
society in a doctrine that it is not a question of wrongness in the taking of
human life. But, since we have not yet evolved into an amoral society, the
courtroom does not appear to be the proper medium for debate on a

philosophical question.

Mr. O'Brien suggests an interesting question arises from the absence of any
mandate in the Durham opinion that the psychiatrist offer testimony on the question of right and wrong.
59 Note that Mr. Chayes equates responsibility and guilt; and in that way relieves
the psychiatrist of any participation in the determination of responsibility. See: Brief

Extracts and An Interview With An Amicus Curiae, post.

60 It may here be noted that in opposition to Mr. O'Brien's theory, Mr. Chayes expressed the view that the function of the Right and Wrong test was to test A's objective
appreciation of right and wrong. Ibid.

It may be said that if the professional opinion of the psychiatrist does not take
right and wrong into consideration, the jury has no evidence of right and
wrong to weigh. It is an interesting question as to whether the jury should
be allowed to consider the question of right and wrong from other factors
in'the evidence despite the lack of the professional testimony on the matter.
Since, under the new ruling the psychiatrist need not present testimony on
the issue of right and wrong, the question arises whether the jury has,
within its own capabilities the requisite understanding of right and
wrong. Our tradition heretofore was to the effect that a jury did not necessarily
need the crutch of a psychiatrist's opinion. Therefore, has this opinion written
into the law a need for the psychiatric crutch before the jury can be
considered competent to weigh this problem?
Law Day-George Washington University
Dr. Winfred Overholser, Mr. Gerard J. O'Brien and Mr. Abrams J. Chayes

participated in a panel discussion concerning the Durham decision at George
Washington University's First Law Day on November 13, 1954. This section
will be devoted to a reprint of the address delivered by Mr. O'Brien.
Prof. Cooper, Dr. Overholser, Mr. Chayes, law students of the University, alumni
and ladies and gentlemen.
It is an honor to share in the inauguration of Law Day at this great University.
It would appear that I am to be a Socratic gadfly on this panel.
My views are to be interpreted "constructive." I might add my remarks do not
necessarily represent those of United States Attorney's office.
The issue of criminal insanity has been submitted to juries since 1843 in terms of the
M'Naghten rule, recognized as the practice existent in this jurisdiction as early as 1882,
as modified for the last quarter of a century by the doctrine of irresistible impulse.
M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 211, Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843); Gaiteau's Case,
1 Mackey 498 (1882); Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895); Smith v. United
States, 59 App. 144 (1929).
A determination of criminal responsibility was stated by the Court of Appeals in
Holloway v. United States, 80 U.S. App. D. C. 3, 4 (1945), to be "nothing more
than a moral judgment that it is just or unjust to blame an accused for his criminal
act". The degree of that blame had direct relation to the capacity of an accused to think
and act rationally on his act, and if knowing it wrong and not irresistibly compelled to do
the act by reason of derangement of the mind, then the law imposed responsibility.
The Supreme Court in Leland v.Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 801 (decided June 9, 1952),
cited Holloway for the proposition that ". . . choice of a test of legal sanity involves not
only scientific knowledge but questions of basic policy as to the extent to which that
knowledge should determine criminal responsibility". The longevity of the right and wrong
doctrine indicated some practical utility; it is the exclusive test of criminal responsibility
in a majority of American jurisdictions, Leland v. Oregon, sapra, at 800, and the long
survival of this basic test reflect the difficulty of substituting one having the virtue of equal
precision.
It was of no minimal consequence to the community at large that a division of the
Court of Appeals had adopted a test of criminal responsibility that appeared to alter
materially our settled rule of criminal responsibility.
Certainly, substitution of a new rule presented ". . . issues (that) are intricate enough
to invoke the pooled wisdom of the circuit." Western Pac, R. Co., supra, at 271, (concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter), and it was submitted to the Court that the public
interest would be served by an opinion reflecting the views of the Court en banc as to the
need of any change.
The Court's decision was based on its power to change settled law in the light of
reason and experience. And it was respectfully submitted that just as the public had the
benefit of the wisdom of all the judges in the formulation of the M'Naghten rule the
public interest should be similarly served in devising any detailed guide deemed necessary
for the future. The Court denied the rehearing en banc.
Turning to the decision, generally.
A. The Court in its opinion explicitly disapproved the "right and wrong test" as inadequate, not in step with "psychic -realities and scientific knowledge", and has characterized
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the classic test as "one symptom" that cannot be validly applied in all circumstances. The
irresistible impulse test was also declared inadequate because the word "impulse" connotes
immediacy and does not circumscribe mental illness characterized by brooding and reflection. The Court formulated a new test-"It is simply that an accused is not criminally
responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect."
To fill a void the Court formulated the new test in an approved instruction, couched
in the language of causality, and omitting any reference to a jury's moral responsibility.
The issue of moral responsibility is clearly implicit in the superseded test. To omit reference
to it is to confuse a jury whose ultimate function, the Court recognizes in the opinion, is to
make a moral judgment. Moral responsibility is an unqualified standard. The trier of the
fact should be forcibly reminded of this especially where, as here, legal insanity is described
in terms of causality, a variable standard not clearly limited as to degree.
It must be heeded that despite the negative aspects of the Court's opinion about the
"right-wrong" and "irresistible impulse" tests, it ended on a positive note, i.e., "The jury's

range of inquiry will not be limited to, but may include, for example, whether an accused,

who suffered from a mental disease or defect did not know the difference between right and
wrong, acted under the compulsion of an irresistible impulse, or had 'been deprived of or
" (citing State v. White, No. 5724, decided May 12, 1954,
lost the power of his will * *
Supreme Court of New Mexico, 22 U.S.L. Week 2559) (slip opinion at 26).
Now, the specific question of irresistibleimpulse.
B. The criticism of the Court that the doctrine of irresistible impulse "carries the
misleading implication that diseased mental condition(s) produce only sudden, momentary
or spontaneous inclinations-" (slip opinion at 21) is rather perplexing. Obviously, the
two characteristics of an impulse are its strong tendency to initiate action and its lack of
deliberation. The word "impulse" need not actually exclude at law an action premised on
a brooding, simmering intellect, if we are to acknowledge the advances of psychiatry. In
fact a broader interpretation of the impulse doctrine is commendable; yet the Court's
opinion sounds the problem without resolution. There is an apparent continuation of the
narrow doctrine from the quotation I just read to you, that is, "The range of inquiry will
* (whether the accused) acted under the comnot be limited to, but may include
*" ibid. If the criticism of the Court is valid, future
pulsion of an irresistible impulse
instructions of the trial courts should include this broader meaning where there exists
evidence to support a defense by reason of an impulse. Hence the Court's opinion is not
entirely clear on this point.
Considering right and wrong.
The right and wrong doctrine is no longer an exclusive test or criterion, but remains
valid where the sumptomatology does justify an instruction.
The Court found that as an "exclusive" criterion the right-wrong test was inadequateinadequate in the sense of circumscribing the entire field of criminal responsibility. The test
was not to have a valid application across the board. Right and wrong is purely symptomatic,
and, apparently, excludes other symptoms that in their aggregate would equally negate criminal
responsibility. The Court does not state or define those other symptoms but shifts this
burden to "psychic realities and scientific knowledge" (slip opinion at 22). The Court's
view seems to give way to a concept of subjective wrong rather than objective wrong. For
that reason wrongness per se cannot be an exclusive test. What does this mean? Well, if a
criminal from the circumstantial facts of a crime would appear to comprehend that his
criminal act is wrong and even if his admissions against interest may likewise indicate an
appreciation for the wrongness of his act-this is of no material significance. Why?
Because of the criminal's motives. His motives may color an otherwise objective understanding of wrongness to be subjectively not wrong.
I say the Court's view appears to give way to the subjective, freudian test, but then
again it does not exclude the question of right and wrong where it has relevant application.
It is confusing whether the classical test as it is allowed to survive continues as it did
before or as the court would imply its criticism is to be followed. Like the impulse test,
the question is raised but without resolution.
And so, the Court propounds, what it calls "A broader test" of criminal responsibility
(slip opinion at 22).
Let us consider the new test.
C. A question will immediately rise to mind, and certainly to the jury's mind, as to
what is a disease or defect? The new instructions require: "If you the jury believe beyond
defective mental
a reasonable doubt that the accused was not suffering from a diseased or him
guilty."
condition at the time he committed the criminal act charged, you may find
The Court defines disease in the sense of "a condition which is considered capable of
either improving or deteriorating." It is doubtful that that definition adds much to the

jury's knowledge. Nor does the definition of "defect," which is the opposite of a disease,
in that it is "a condition which is not considered capable of either improving or deteriorating
and which may be either congenital, or the result of injury, or the residual effect of a physical
or mental disease." The vagueness of these concepts to a jury's mind may be productive
of confusion; not a desirable by-product of a standard that is to measure criminal responsibility.
It is doubtful that the word "disease" will have any significance to the science of
psychiatry in that disease has a certain pathological connotation not descriptive of a
unctional disorganization or psychogenic condition. Disease may be as vague as "insanity,"
a word having significance only at law. Thus, psychiatrists may find difficulty channeling
their diagnostic testimony within the legal confines of disease or defect.
Of course the broader concept of merely an unsound mind or mental illness has a
greater range of understanding but the propounded instructions delimit that range to disease
or defect.
However, should the jury acting as laboratory technicians abstract from the evidence
by whatever side it is produced that the accused suffered a diseased or defective mind at the
incident of the criminal act, to the degree they believe it (and I might mention the Court did
not say "reasonably believe," but I suppose that is presumed) then the jury to arrive at
guilt must believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the act was not the product of such
mental abnormality.
Considering now--causal connection.

The question of causal connection has obvious difficulties. Is the mental abnormality to
be the proximate or approximate cause? The superseded test more or less presumed the
causal connection, that is, if a person simply suffered an unsound mind, regardless of
whether it be diseased or defective, the jury's task was to determine beyond a reasonable
doubt whether the accused understood his act to be wrong or was irresistibly impelled to its
commission. The jury was never required to find a specific causal connection.
Psychiatry too may find this concept of productivity as wide as the horizon. The mental
science does not proclaim certitude, it cannot empirically measure a delusion or other
psychogenic symptoms to a degree that it can positively assure productivity. We can only
await the onslaught of psychic realities on this point.
With these underlying complications of the "broadened" test, it is readily apparent
that the burden falls squarely on the government-and I needn't remind you that the
Government represents the social weal. The government to achieve guilt must prove each
and every necessary element of the new test beyond a reasonable doubt. If the new test
is innately confusing it may naturally create doubts in the jury's mind, and entertaining such
doubt, they would be required to reach a not guilty verdict. It would be unfortunate if the
evidence did not create doubt, but rather the legal test did.
What will this mean to future prosecutions.
D. It is well established in the law that a layman when properly qualified may express
an opinion with respect to a person's mental condition in both the civil and criminal law.
Is it now allowable for a layman to give an opinion on whether a person suffers a diseased
or defective mind? The Court's opinion expressed a desire to equalize the criminal with the
civil law but certainly no harsh requirement of disease or defect exists civilly to disprove
testamentary capacity. Query: May only an expert testify to the new standard?
We do not have a psychiatrist at the elbow of every criminal and where apprehension
is long months, a year or two after the crime, a psychiatrist may be unable to determine
the mental condition on the crime date. With no expert testimony, does it mean that the
Government may not successfully prosecute under the new test?
It must be remembered that under the Tatum rule announced by this Court "only
some evidence" is sufficient to raise the defense of insanity, no matter how "weak, insufficient,
inconsistent of or doubtful credibility" that evidence may be--and especially the defense
evidence needs no psychiatric support beyond the exclaimed defense by the accused himself.
If the new test broadens the standard at law, it certainly does not appear to broaden
it in favor of the Government. We have not had a sufficient number of cases under the new
test to statistically analyze the test's impact on the criminal administration of justice. It will
require some time to determine that factor.
E. It is argued, however, that the social interest is not harmed because under § 24-301
of the D. C. Code the Court may refer a case where there is a verdict of not guilty by reason
of insanity to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. In a recent brief I argued
that the referral by the Court is not discretionary but mandatory, under Title 24, § 211 of the
United States Code which repeals, pro tanto, the earlier District of Columbia legislation.
However, both statutes provide that commitment by the Secretary is discretionary. Incidentally,

this very topic is mentioned in footnote No. 57 in the Durham decision, which was amended
on October 13, 1954.
The discretion of the Secretary appears absolute. It would appear also legislation should
be enacted to eliminate this inartful procedure. The courts should of their own power commit
directly to the hospital on such a verdict. Something similar to the law of Massachusetts
dealing with insane felons would also be appropriate to protect the public from premature
release to the community. In fact, a defective felon by the nature of things could possibly
never be a safe risk in the community. Yet there is no recourse from the decision of the
Secretary or standard to be applied for commitment under the present statutes.
Beside increasing the obligations of the Government under the Durham decision, the
Court gave full warning of a possible "partial responsibility" rule in the Stewart decision.
Now, the full implications of these two decisions cannot be appreciated alone. They are
part of a composite or mosaic picture being painted by the Court. Studying the picture, let
us now concentrate on a few trees to the disregard of the forest.
In the recent Wear case, the Court interpreted § 4244 of Title 18, the incompetency
statute, in such fashion as to eliminate from the statute the right of the Court to determine
the reasonableness of the grounds of a defense motion, or even a government motion, seeking
the Court's inquiry into or examination of the mental competency of an accused to stand
trial. Competency is a mental condition distinct from that of insanity at the commission
of an offense. But there can be a relationship. The Court interpreted this statute to only
allow denial of such a motion when it is not in good faith or is frivolous. Obviously, subjective good faith of a movant is a delicate question not usually ascertainable and not normally
doubted by a court. Thus, the frivolousness standard is all that remains in the statute which
incidentally does not use the term at all, but rather reasonable cause.
And, as a correlary and one more tree in our mosaic, in the recent Gunther decision,
this same section 4244, was interpreted to require, upon the return by the Hospital
authorities of an accused committed by the court and now medically determined competent
to stand trial that the court may not customarily accept the medical finding of the doctors
of St. Elizabeths Hospital or any Federal hospital as to the competency of an accused person
to stand trial. The Court's opinion admitted its construction of the statute rested on an
implicit rather than an explicit provision of the statute. The Court pursued the argument
that psychiatrists couldn't determine full competency, but only a judge trained in the law.
What is perplexing is that under the Wear case the Court rejected the right of the
trial court to determine whether the grounds asserted are reasonable to believe a question of
competency exists, for the alleged reason, that it would be an attempt to detect mental
disorders not "readily apparent to the eye of the layman." (slip opinion at 6). But under
the Gunther decision, the eye of the layman, the judge, is a necessary check on the expertly
trained eye of the psychiatrist.
And now for the forest:

The ease with which the defense may invoke the competency statute, the lack of
adequate medical facilities at the present time to readily check the malingerer from being
the legitimate, gives a criminal a potential advantage to delay and frustrate justice. And
possibly to develop a convenient history of mental commitment in order to raise the defense
of insanity, to require the Government to meet its burden, and finally to reach the stage
where the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare must arbitrarily measure the community
interest against available beds. The acquitted, of course, may challenge by habeas corpus the
power of the hospital authorities to further detain him.
It is an interesting picture--and like modern art, is subject to varying interpretations.
Brief-Extracts and An Interview With An Amicus Curiae-Abrams J. Chayes*
While the Durham case was pending, Mr. Abrams J. Chayes was appointed
an Amicus Curiae by the court in a similar case: Stewart v. United States."l In
the amicus brief, Mr. Chayes requested that the defendant should have the benefit
of any change in the tests of legal insanity then applicable in the district.
In a personal interview with Mr. Chayes concerning the new ruling in the
Durham decision, he expressed the opinion that the new test for legal insanity
*A.B. Harvard University 1943; LL.B. Harvard University 1949; Mr. Chayes is a member
of both the District and the Connecticut Bars and an Associate ia the law firm of
Covington & Burling in the District of Columbia.
6' 93 U.S. App. D.C. (Slip opinion).

"reflects more adequately current levels of scientific and public understanding of
the nature and causes of mental disorder." He said: "It (the test) affords the
expert witness an opportunity to display more fully his technical knowledge of
defendant's complete mental condition."
His criticism, spelled out in the brief, emphasized the major deficiencies in
the old tests:
In the first place, concentration on one of two symptoms ignores the growing
understanding of the causes and nature of mental disease, a growth which has
been conspicuously marked in the century since (those) tests were first
formulated. This scientific development which to a large extent has been
embodied in the general public attitude towards mental disease, has demon.
strated beyond contradiction that the critical symptoms of the (old) judicial
tests do not necessarily, or even in the majority of cases, in fact accompany
a serious mental disorder . . . Indeed, scientific development has shown that
emphasis upon rational activity, or any single phase of mental activity, is
affirmatively misleading.

Mr. Chayes felt that in many instances a defendant, who was clearly men.
tally disordered and therefore clearly not responsible for his acts was at the same
time shown to have appreciated the difference between objective right and wrong.
Under the old rules, the jury was required, in order to mete out substantial justice,
to ignore its oath and acquit the defendant. Injustice was many times avoided
by the jury's distortion of the rules. But, the more serious consideration was the
probability that many times under the instructions, the jury convicted where the
defendant was in fact irresponsible and should have been acquitted.
The question propounded to the psychiatrist under the Right and wrong
test, viz.: Did the defendant know the difference between right and wrong when
he committed the act?, according to Mr. Chayes, violated one of the fundamental
rules of evidence because it required the psychiatrist to answer what constituted
the ultimate question of the fact of the defendant's responsibility. And the
difficulty was compounded in that the answer was required in terms which are
irreconcilable with the psychiatrist's special training and knowledge.6 2
In the view of the amicus: the issue of responsibility should be submitted
"simply and directly to the jury." He conveyed his thought that the jury is
capable of answering the question of criminal responsibility, if propounded under
the new rules and of determining the ultimate question of fact of the defendant's
responsibility. For, he said:
When the jury comes in, they are more or less representative of the general
moral attitudes and level of scientific understanding of the community at large.
During the course of the trial, they will be subjected to an intensive technical
"course" in psychiatry as applied to the particular defendant. In the end they
will be in a perfect position to mediate in their judgment between the general
moral sense of the community and the more specialized professional outlook
of the psychiatric witnesses.

For a very interesting criticism of the old tests, an analysis of the Holloway"3
62 Mr. O'Brien considers the question not to constitute an ultimate question of fact,
and that in answering such question as to the defendant's knowledge of right and
wrong, he is expressing an opinion in which the jury may either accept or reject, in weighing
all the evidence.
6380 U.S. App. D.C. 3, 148 F. 2d 665 (1945).

opinion by the amicus in his brief, can be examined.
was insisted:

In the Holloway case, it

Legal tests of criminality are not and cannot be the result of scientific analysis
or objective judgment. There is no objective standard by which
such a judgment of an admittedly abnormal offender can be measured.6 4
Psychiatry offers us no standard for measuring the validity of the jury's moral
judgment as to culpability.5

Mr. Chayes analyzes as follows:
Do they (the old tests) not attempt to standardize what this court rightly
recognizes as essentially a subjective moral judgment given by the jury as the
epitome of the moral sense of the community? Do they not compound the
offense by erecting as the objective test and measure symptoms which coincide
neither with the medical findings as to the nature of the disease nor the moral
notions of culpability?
We should improve both the science and the candor of the administration
of the defense of insanity by abandoning the present symptom-oriented tests
in putting the moral issue to the jury on a broad factual instruction . . .
This ultimate moral issue is peculiarly in the province of the jury. It should
be left to that body upon all the evidence, lay, expert and the jury's own
observations of the defendant in court ... Once it is recognized, as this court
has done in the Holloway case, that the ultimate judgment is a moral one,
it follows that it is impossible to assure mechanical equality of result by
imprisoning the moral judgment in the strictures of a logical formula. (Emphasis added.)
Concerning our discussion of the procedural aspects of the Durham decision
which constituted grounds for reversal, Mr. Chayes stated that in reference to the

"some evidence" rule, he considered the lower court's application of this doctrine
as inaccurate.

Since there was testimony as to the mental condition of the defendant before
and after the time of the crime and thus the court could have drawn an inference that as to the mental condition
at the67time of the act, the "some
66
evidence" rule of the Tatum case was satisfied.
When the question was put to Mr. Chayes concerning the importance of a
consideration by the court and the expert witness, of the metaphysical question of
freedom of the will so obviously involved in a question of criminal responsibility,
he answered:
We should not attempt to impart refined and formal philosophical or metaphysical notions directly into the system of law. The community consensus on
such controversies will be reflected mediately in the body of the law through
the operation of juries and the decisions of judges whose roots are in a social
and cultural context common to us all. The result, of course, is fuzzinesslack of precision. But this should not bother common-lawyers. Indeed, it
is one of the glories of our law that it can serve a community so diverse as
ours, and that men with quite antagonistic philosophical pre-suppositions-lawyers and laymen alike-may ask and receive justice of it.
64 Id. at 4.
65 Id. at 5.
66 Tatum v. United States, 88 U.S. App. D.C. 386, 190 F. 2d 612 (1951).
67 In reference to this point, it must be remembered that when insanity is interposed
as a defense to criminal responsibility under the Right and Wrong test, we are concerned
with cause and effect and the specific time at which the crime charged was committed. Inferences are weak in the light of such a tenuous situation. Hence, it would appear to the
writers that Judge Holtzoff who rendered the decision in the lower court was giving full
import to the words of the M'Naghten rule when he found that there was "no evidence" of
the defendant's mental condition at the time of the act and that the initial presumption of
sanity was not overcome.

Abe Fortas v. The Evening Star
In a letter to the Evening Star Newspaper Publication, published November
10, 1954, Mr. Fortas, appointed by the Appellate Court in the Durham case to
defend the accused, expressed his fears that the Star's editorials have contributed
to a Basic Misunderstandingon the part of some of the citizens of the District of
Columbia as to the meaning and effect of the new ruling.*
Excerpts have been taken both from this letter, (in order to present the views
of one so closely connected with the decision), and from the Editorial which
appeared in this publication on the same day.
Mr. Fortas writes the following concerning the old tests:
These tests were formulated long before the discoveries of modern psychiatry
revolutionized our understanding of the human personality. They are as
obsolete as the belief that an insane person is possessed by the devil.
There is widespread agreement that the tests do not provide a useful basis for
distinguishing between those who should and those who should not be
punished for their acts. In practice, the "right and wrong" test is frequently
abandoned. Where it is proved that an accused person is "insane" and
"irresponsible," the common sense of judges and juries has often prevailed
even though it is clear that the defendant knew that his act was wrong.
For many years, our law has not required that there be specific proof that the
accused did not know the difference between right and wrong. Evidence from
which this may be inferred (however arbitrarily) has been deemed sufficient.
The real difficulty with the "right and wrong" and "irresistible impulse" tests,
however, is that they seriously interfere with a scientific determination of the
mental condition of the accused. They make it needlessly difficult for psychiatrists to lay before the court and the jury a complete and objective account of
the psychiatrist's diagnoses of the accused's mental condition. Demanding
that psychiatrists testify in these terms is like asking a doctor to testify as to
whether a man has pneumonia and insisting that the standard by which the
patient is to be judged is whether he blushes.
The ability to distinguish between right and wrong is neither a disease
nor a symptom. The vast majority of persons who are insane are aware of
the difference between right and wrong conduct, but they may be incapable
of adjusting their conduct to the consequences of this knowledge.
Because of the wide gap between psychiatric reality and the legal formula,
many competent psychiatrists have preferred not to participate in criminal
proceedings. They have felt that they are not competent to testify as to "right
and wrong," and they have not been willing to submit to questioning based
on these standards which, to them, relate to metaphysics and not to their
science.

About the new test to be applied in the District, Mr. Fortas approvingly
declares that:
This test enables the psychiatrist to tell the court all that he knows about the
defendant, and to tell it in terms that are accurately descriptive of his diagnosis. He does not have to face the sometimes impossible and always
distasteful prospect, under the questioning of lawyers, of fitting his scientific
findings to the mold of irrelevant legal cliches.
Durham's rule makes possible genuine and fundamental progress in the cooperation between psychiatry and criminal administration. It represents
a conspicuous advance which, I believe, will result in improved administration of the criminal law to the benefit of both the accused persons and the
community.
Mr. Fortas proceeded to discuss what happens when a verdict of "not guilty
*Permission granted to the authors of this article by Mr. Fortas.

by reason of insanity" is rendered and what the law provides concerning commitment to a mental institution:
Under our law, when a verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity" is entered,
it does not mean that the defendant is released from custody. On the contrary,
the law clearly empowers the judge to place the defendant in the custody of the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare. The defendant is then placed
under surveillance and is treated at a mental institution so long "as the public
safety and ... (his) welfare require." He should not be released until the
authorities of the institution are reasonably certain that his mental condition
will not result in the commission of new crimes.
The point is that the defendant is not punished by being put in jail. Instead,
he is treated for his mental condition. But he is in custody in either event. The
Durham case does not affect this practice, which preceded the case and which
is still followed.
It is true that the trial judge has discretion and is not compelled by law to
commit to a mental institution a defendant acquitted on grounds of insanity
at the time the crime was committed if the defendant is sane at the time of
trial. But this discretion existed when the "right and wrong" and "irresistible impulse" tests were followed. It was not the result of the Durham
case. There is, therefore, no basis for the statement in The Star's editorial
of October 7 that the "new rule" will "bring about the release of criminals
from whom the public should be protected."

In its editorial, the Evening Star explains its statement which appeared in a
former issue of the Star on October 7th, 1954:
Mr. Fortas does not spell out the precise nature of the "basic misunderstanding" he has in mind. He does say, however, that there is "no basis for the
statement in The Star's editorial of October 7 that the 'new rule' will 'bring
about the release of criminals from whom the public should be protected.' "
This is a misleading interpretation of that editorial. The statement which Mr.
Fortas says has "no basis" was not The Star's statement, although it may
well prove to be entirely correct, but rather a report of a statement by United
States Attorney Rover. And it was made pursuant to a comment by District
Judge Schweinhaut with reference to the new insanity definition. Judge
Schweinhaut said this: "The defense of insanity is going to be used by every
other defendant who comes into this court. We are embarked on a new era."
The Evening Star Newspaper has taken a tremendous interest in the outcome
of the Durham decision. By means of an Editorial, the Star posed a number of
questions in reply to the Fortas letter:
The appellate court rejected the "irresistible impulse" test as being "inadequate
in that it gives no recognition to mental illness characterized by brooding and
reflection .... ." With reference to its new test the court said: "We use
'disease' in the sense of a condition which is considered capable of either improving or deteriorating. We use 'defect' in the sense of a condition which is
not considered capable of either improving or deteriorating and which may
be either congenital, or the result of injury, or the residual effect of a
physical or mental disease."
What, precisely, does this mean, as applied to a defense in a criminal case?
Perhaps the appellate judges know. But The Star doubts very much that it will
be meaningful to jurors. And some of our trial judges have said that its
meaning is obscure to them.
Mr. Fortas, touched upon the point that a trial judge, after a finding of not
guilty by reason of insanity, has authority to commit the accused to a mental
institution. The Court of Appeals, as an afterthought, made the same point
in an amendment to the Monte Durham decision. But there is a hitch to this.
In a companion case, the appellate court ruled that a trial judge must make
an affirmative finding, at the time of trial, that an accused person is of sound

mind, able to advise with his counsel and assist in his own defense. It is
entirely conceivable, however, that such a person might be acquitted on the
ground that he had a mental defect at the time of his offense and that
the crime was a product of that defect. What happens then?
The Court of Appeals advises the trial judge to commit such a defendant to,
say, St. Elizabeths. But the defendant, alter the commission of the offense,
has been found to be of sound mind in the sense of being competent to stand
trial. Is the trial judge to commit a man of sound mind to an institution for
the insane? Is that institution, its own psychiatrists having made the finding
of sanity for purposes of standing trial, going to detain him for very long?
The Star fears that the answers to these questions, as they are worked out in
practice, will be adverse to the interests of the law-abiding people of this city.
The new definition of insanity undeniably throws a greater safeguard around
a person accused of a crime, if he chooses to plead insanity as a defense. But
as a practical matter it certainly does not add to, and may subtract from,
the protection which the public heretofore has had from persons suffering
from a mental defect-whatever the exact meaning of that term may be.
In any event, it will be important to watch the workings of this new rule,
as it is applied from day to day in the operation of the criminal courts, and
The Star intends to do this.
Experience may show that the new legal definition of insanity as written by
the Court of Appeals is broader than the standards which seem now to be
applied in medical diagnosis of a condition requiring indefinite detention in a
hospital for the insane, for treatment of the individual and protection of the
public. If such a gap between legal definition and medical diagnosis of insanity
exists, ways must be found to close it.
Conclusion
It is apparent from the various streams of thought, theory and opinion, which
the Durham decision has already invited, that we are confronted with a very serious
problem of whether the new test is a step upon the path of progress or a step in
the wrong direction. It is conceded that "it was time for a change" in order to
keep abreast of scientific advancement in the study of mental illness. However,
in our anxiety to better the existing rules, a change for change sake should never be
the motivation. The merits of what we have, should be prudently weighed before
being cast aside.
A fear that the Durham decision opens the door too wide to a variety of
untenable psychiatric testimony may well be justified. On its face, the new
decision offers unlimited freedom in the elicitation of psychiatric testimony, devoid
of any restrictions upon any one school of psychiatric thinking. However, by not
preserving the old tests as a mandatory consideration, the court engenders an
abuse of this new freedom by sanctioning a situation whereby testimony of only
one school of psychiatric thinking is introduced.
It is the duty of the court not just to offer the opportunity for, but to assure
the presentation of the various, valid conflicting theories of psychiatric thinking.
The Durham court said: ". . . the jury's range of inquiry may include .. . for
example, whether an accused, who suffered from a mental disease or defect did not
know the difference between right and wrong, acted under the compulsion of an
irresistible impulse, or had 'been deprived of or lost the power of his will' . . ."
This is by no means an assurance that our concept of free will which is the foun-

dation of the entire jurisprudence of the criminal law, will be secured against
change or risk.
From this mere offer of the opportunity to consider the old tests, it may be
reasonably inferred that the court favored the determinist school of psychiatric
thinking. Judicial decisions should not reflect such favoritism, if we are to presume
that the science of jurisprudence is to be objective and impartial in weighing aU
relevant testimony upon the scales of justice. This accusation of favoritism may be
refuted in that it is mere tolerance on the part of the court. Objectivity and
impartiality means a tolerance which is right-but only in the presence of schools
of thought which partake of truth in the objective order. However,.... Tolerance is not right when its basic principle is a denial of truth and goodness and
when it asserts that it makes no difference whether murder is a blessing or a crime,
or whether a child should be taught to steal or to respect the rights of others",6 8
or whether the unconscious factors of man's intellectual processes coerce his will
to such an extent that his acts are determined or whether man always has the
free will to choose.
Proposal
A ruling which would truly be a step forward in helping to solve the many
problems in the field of criminal insanity, should require: (1) that the Right and
Wrong test be maintained as one of the criterion in the determination of criminal
insanity precisely because of its value in the ascertainment of the defendant's moral
responsibility based upon his subjective appreciation of the nature and quality of
the particular act; (2) that the doctrine known as Irresistible Impulse should be
replaced by an "unresisted urge" test, the theory of which is: that even if the
defendant was able to distinguish between right and wrong, yet, if due to a mental
disorder his intellect was so influenced, weakened or impeded in judging rightly on
the desirability of his action, that he failed to resist the urge, chose to act, then he
should not be legally responsible, i.e., non-guilty. This test would lay the foundation for determining whether or not a verdict of guilty should be rendered. It
would preserve the concept of freedom of the will in the mentally ill person, and
at the same time permit the jury to render a merciful verdict of not-guilty even
in the face of moral responsibility; and (3) that as an additional aid in the
determination of legal responsibility, the permitting of unhampered psychiatric
testimony, in ascertaining whether or not the accused is suffering from a mental
illness, and whether the particular act charged is a result of such illness.
The aforementioned proposed-means for the determination of criminal insanity could be arrived at if the courts would apply the principles of the Cavanagh
treatise to the Durham ruling, when deciding future cases of this nature. Such
68 Sheen, Way To Inner Peace, New York: Maco Magazine Corp. 1954, p. 69. Most
Reverend Fulton J. Sheen, former Professor of Philosophy at the Catholic University of
America, presents an excellent analysis of the 'Right Attitude Toward Those Who Differ
With Us' in this work.

application would be an invaluable aid in bringing about relief from punishment
for the criminal act which is the product of mental illness, without destroying our
traditional concept of responsibility for crime.
This proposal could be the beginnings of rationality in the jurisprudence of
insanity.
NATALIE R. YEAGER
GENNARO

J. CONSALVO

Motorist Statutes and FederalJurisdiction
An automobile collision occurs on a state highway. The injured party consults
an attorney concerning the possibility of bringing an action against the negligent
driver, or his principal, or the manufacturer of the car, or all of them.
A tort action being transitory in nature, the attorney may bring the action in
either the federal' or state courts having their situs in the jurisdiction where the
defendant resides. Clearly, however, this might well entail great inconvenience to
the plaintiff or his witnesses and certainly may not bring the action to a "just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination."
In addition, regardless of where the defendant resides, the attorney may
bring the action in the courts of the state wherein the collision occurred. All
2
forty-eight states and the District of Columbia have enacted motorist statutes
which universally provide that simply by driving on the state highways, a nonresident motorist becomes amenable by operation of law to suit for accidents
caused by his negligent operation of his automobile. Furthermore, these statutes
usually provide for the "implied appointment" of some state official as a lawful
agent or attorney to receive service of process for the non-resident. No
objection to jurisdiction or adjective Due Process may be raised successfully. 8
The plaintiff is thus assured of at least three forums which will adjudicate his cause.
If the defendant is sued in a state court and actually is a non-resident, he has
a constitutional and statutory right of removal of the negligence action to the
IJudiciary and Judicial Procedure, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1331, 1332, 1391 (1948); Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U. S. C. Rules 4 (d) and (f) (1938).

2 Cf. An extensive analysis of all non-resident motorist statutes in Knoop v. Anderson,
71 F. Supp. 832, 836-837 (N. D. Iowa 1937); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (3d ed.
1949), § 73 (6); Scott, Jurisdiction Over Non-Resident Motorist, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 563
(1926); 20 Iowa L. Rev. 654 (1935).
8Cf. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 (1927) wherein the Supreme Court decided
that the difference between the "formal and implied appointment" of an agent for service
of process "is not substantial" under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
for the purpose of state jurisdiction; Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160 (1916); Hendrick
v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610 (1915).

